Hardware support for trusted execution in modern CPUs enables tenants to shield their data processing workloads in otherwise untrusted cloud environments. Runtime systems for the trusted execution must rely on an interface to the untrusted host OS to use external resources such as storage, network, and other functions. Attackers may exploit this interface to leak data or corrupt the computation.
Introduction
In domains such as healthcare [3, 73, 107] and finance [20, 53] , it is challenging to run sensitive workloads in public cloud environments due to security concerns [23] . For example, when training a machine learning model, both the training data and the model may be confidential, and the integrity of the model must be ensured.
In a cloud environment, however, the data and computation may be disclosed or corrupted due to cloud infrastructure bugs [44] , misconfigurations [92] , rogue administrators [36, 63] , or external attacks [6, 43] .
Modern Intel [24] , ARM [7] and AMD [4] CPUs offer hardware support for trusted execution environments (TEEs) [83] . A TEE protects the confidentiality and integrity of computation and data that is shielded from the rest of the system.
Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [24] add new CPU instructions that give userspace processes the ability to execute code within isolated memory regions called enclaves. The contents of SGX enclaves are encrypted and integrityprotected transparently by the hardware.
Cloud providers have begun to roll out support for TEEs [47, 65] . This makes a "lift-and-shift" model-in which tenants move a whole application to a TEE-an attractive proposition. TEE runtime systems, such as Haven [10] , SCONE [8] and Graphene-SGX [95] , have demonstrated the feasibility of executing complete Linux applications inside TEEs with acceptable performance overheads.
When applications inside a TEE require external resources, such as files, the network or other OS functions, they must rely on the untrusted host OS. TEE runtime systems therefore have a host interface, but its security implications are poorly understood and handled: the host interface may (i) accidentally expose state from the TEE to the outside by leaking sensitive data in calls [91] ; (ii) act as a side channel where the existence or absence of a call reveals application state [101] ; and (iii) have a malicious implementation and thus compromise application integrity inside the TEE [19] .
Existing TEE runtime systems vary in the types of interfaces that they expose to hosts, and the nature of the interface is a consequence of their design. As a result, current systems expose wide and difficult-toprotect host interfaces, which may compromise the security guarantees of TEEs.
We explore the opposite approach: we begin our design of a TEE runtime system with a desired secure host interface, and then decide on the necessary system support inside the TEE. We aim for a host interface with three properties: (1) minimality-only functionality that cannot be provided inside the TEE should be part of it; (2) protection-all data that crosses the host interface must be encrypted and integrity-protected; and (3) obliviousness-the presence or absence of host calls should not disclose information about the application state.
We describe SGX-LKL, a new TEE runtime system that executes unmodified Linux binaries inside Intel SGX enclaves while exposing a minimal, data-protected and oblivious host interface. 1 To protect the host interface, the design of SGX-LKL makes three contributions:
(1) Minimal host interface ( §3). SGX-LKL only requires a host interface with 7 calls, exposing only low-level functionality for block-level I/O for storage and packet-level I/O for networking. Higher-level POSIX functionality is implemented in SGX-LKL by porting a complete Linux-based library OS to an SGX enclave. SGX-LKL uses the Linux Kernel Library (LKL) [80] to obtain a mature POSIX implementation, including a virtual file systems layer and a TCP/IP network stack.
(2) Protected host interface ( §4). SGX-LKL ensures that all I/O operations across the host interface are encrypted and integrity-protected transparently: (i) for file I/O, SGX-LKL uses an encrypted Linux ext4 root file system image stored outside of the SGX enclave, which is accessed using the device mapper framework [30] of the Linux kernel; and (ii) for network I/O, SGX-LKL creates a virtual private network (VPN) overlay that secures all network traffic. Layer-3 IP packets are encrypted by the in-kernel Wireguard [105] VPN implementation.
To verify the integrity of a SGX-LKL instance and provide cryptographic keys, SGX-LKL supports a runtime attestation and provisioning process: it first attests the integrity of the SGX-LKL implementation inside the SGX enclave and then provisions the instance with the keys required to access the encrypted root file system image and the VPN channels.
(3) Oblivious host interface ( §5). To prevent any information leakage as part of the host interface, SGX-LKL makes the calls independent of the application workload inside the SGX enclave: (i) SGX-LKL executes host calls in fixed batches, and each batch includes the same number of calls by adding indistinguishable dummy calls; (ii) for block I/O requests, SGX-LKL uses an oblivious construction that reuses the existing ext4 file system image format. The encrypted blocks in the file system image are shuffled, which only exposes a random access pattern to the host. Between shuffles, SGX-LKL reads a block at most once by relying on the in-enclave page cache.
Our experimental evaluation shows that SGX-LKL expose a secure host interface with a reasonable performance overhead. With emulated SGX enclaves (to ignore current SGX memory limitations), SGX-LKL trains common deep neural network models using TensorFlow [93] with an overhead of 14%-21% with oblivious calls. With current SGX hardware, SGX-LKL runs PARSEC benchmarks that fit into SGX memory with an average overhead of 1.5× and 3.1× with and without oblivious calls, respectively.
Host Interfaces for Trusted Execution
We analyse current host interfaces of TEE runtime systems.
Trusted execution environments in clouds
We assume that a cloud provider supports CPU-implemented trusted execution environments (TEEs). TEEs separate userspace code and data from the rest of the system, including higher privileged system software such as the OS kernel [37] . Multiple TEE implementations are commercially available, including Intel SGX [24] , ARM TrustZone [7] and AMD SEV [4], with several others under way [57, 74, 86 ].
Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [24] provide new CPU instructions to create TEEs called enclaves. Enclave memory is encrypted and integrity-protected transparently by the CPU. The CPU controls transitions from untrusted to enclave code, and only enclave code can access enclave memory. Due to this isolation, enclave code has no I/O access but must use the untrusted host OS kernel.
Intel SGX also supports attestation, allowing a remote party to validate the enclave code. For this, the CPU (i) measures the enclave's contents by computing a hash; (ii) signs the measurement hash; and (iii) provides it to the attesting party. The attestor can verify the signature and the hash.
For the deployment of applications using TEEs, we focus on a lift-and-shift model [71] : users deploy unmodified Linux binaries. For binary compatibility, this requires a TEE runtime system [8, 10, 95] , which provides POSIX abstractions. TEE runtime systems must use functionality by the untrusted host OS for operations outside of the trust domain of the TEE, e.g. when using I/O resources. We refer to the interface between the TEE runtime system and the host as the host interface.
Security goals and threat model
We want to prevent an adversary from compromising the confidentiality and integrity of (i) the application code, (ii) its input and output data, and (iii) all computation inside the TEE.
We consider all software outside the TEE as untrusted and under adversarial control, including the host OS kernel. We assume that the TEE itself is trustworthy because existing attacks against TEEs, e.g. Spectre [61] , Foreshadow [98] and Zombieload [85] , are implementation-specific and orthogonal to our work. They exploit flaws in specific TEE implementations and can be mitigated through hardware and/or microcode changes [51] . As the maturity of different TEE implementations, especially new open-source ones [4, 49, 57] , grows over time, such attacks will become rarer. Cache side channel attacks [16, 41, 68] are not specific to TEEs because they are enabled by micro-architectural resource sharing. They require fundamental mitigations through compiler techniques [15, 21, 72] and defensive programming [28, 75, 84] .
Our threat model focuses on attacks against the host interface, as these are easy to carry out and do not assume particular micro-architectural behaviour. An adversary can (i) compromise confidentiality: they may observe the parameters, frequencies and sequences of host calls. For example, they can observe the disk I/O access pattern to determine the application or workload being run, e.g. linear scans and repeated accesses are easy to identify via the host interface. This side channel discloses information about the TEE execution; (ii) compromise integrity: the adversary may modify the input/output parameters of host calls, repeatedly perform arbitrary host calls or interfere with their execution outside of the TEE [19] . For example, an adversary may cause memory corruption inside the TEE to inject malicious code [58] .
Host interfaces of current TEE runtime systems
Next we analyse the security of the host interfaces of three existing TEE runtime systems: Types of host interface parameters. In our security analysis, we focus on the parameters of host calls because they can leak information to the host or compromise enclave integrity. We categorise parameters into five types, ordered by the difficulty of protection from easiest to hardest: (i) variable-sized buffers pass a user-defined byte array across the host interface. They are used in file/network I/O operations, such as the buf and count parameters in the read() call [82] ; (ii) address ranges represent parameters that refer to regions of untrusted or trusted memory. Examples are the parameters passed to mmap() and the return value of malloc(); (iii) pure/impure identifiers point to entities: impure identifiers, e.g. a path name, disclose information about the entity; pure identifiers, e.g. a file descriptor, only identify an entity; and (iv) semantic parameters refer to parameters with opaque semantics specific to the host call, such as mode and flags for file access operations. Tab. 1 shows the total number of host calls for each TEE runtime system, categorised according to function (I/O, events, time, threading). 2 Panoply exposes a large host interface, with 2 For Panoply and Graphene-SGX, the host calls are taken from the GitHub 302 host calls in total; Graphene-SGX and Haven require 38 and 24 host calls, respectively. We break down the parameters according to the above types, distinguishing between out parameters, which are passed to the host and may compromise confidentiality, and in parameters, which are passed into the TEE and may affect integrity. Confidentiality attacks. To learn sensitive information, an adversary may observe the host call parameters, and the data disclosure depends on the type of out parameters: (i) Variable-sized buffers may contain security-sensitive data. Table 1 shows that Panoply, Graphene-SGX and Haven pass 11, 3 and 1 variable-sized buffers, respectively, to the host for I/O operations; Panoply also uses a variable-sized buffer to share messages between threads.
To ensure data confidentiality, the systems encrypt these buffers, but they all disclose the buffer size to the host. If the size is exposed, an adversary may infer size-dependent secrets. In a machine learning application, e.g. image classification [56] , the outcome of a classifier may have variable length, which enables an adversary to learn the result by considering buffer lengths. Haven implements an in-enclave file system and writes data to the host disk as fixed sized blocks; Graphene-SGX writes 64-KB chunks of data. Such constant buffer sizes still reveal the number of buffers.
(ii) Address ranges passed from the TEE to the host point to continuous memory regions in untrusted memory. As part of I/O operations, Panoply, Graphene-SGX, and Haven expose 17, 1 and 3 address ranges, respectively. An adversary can observe the access pattern of the address range. For example, Panoply uses untrusted memory address ranges for communication between enclaves that isolate compartments of the same application. An adversary can observe the access pattern to reveal application-specific control flows, e.g. a secret-dependent inter-enclave call. (iii) Pure/impure identifiers. Panoply, Graphene-SGX, and Haven use a large number of identifiers for I/O operations, event handling and threading. Similar to address ranges, passing identifiers to the host reveals access patterns. For example, for database searches using a TEE, Cash et al. [17] show that an adversary can learn queries by observing record accesses.
Generally, pure identifiers reveal less information than impure identifiers, e.g. file names, because pure identifiers are typically chosen randomly. Preventing information leakage by impure identifiers can only be done on a case-by-case basis, e.g. by replacing file names with hashes. The above systems do not provide any protection for impure identifiers. (iv) Semantic parameters have a context-specific meaning and therefore cannot be encrypted transparently. Existing runtime systems pass many unprotected semantic parameters directly to the host. In Panoply and Graphene-SGX, when opening a file, the file access mode is leaked. For example, if a file source code [42, 76] ; for Haven, they are obtained from the paper [10] . 
is always opened in a/a+ modes and written frequently, an adversary may infer that it is a log file. Integrity attacks. To compromise integrity, an adversary must tamper with the parameters. Integrity-protecting in parameters varies in difficulty according to the parameter type: (i) Variable-sized buffers passed to the TEE must have their integrity protected. In I/O calls, Panoply, Graphene-SGX, and Haven pass 10, 3 and 1 parameters with variable-sized buffers, respectively, to the TEE. Panoply and Graphene-SGX also use variable-sized buffers to communicate between threads. This exposes two means of integrity attacks: an adversary may modify (i) the buffer contents to violate data integrity; and (ii) the buffer count to trigger an overflow. To ensure buffer integrity, the contents must be protected by an HMAC. The TEE must ensure the freshness of the HMAC, otherwise an adversary can swap two valid buffers or perform a rollback attack. Panoply protects the integrity of the inter-enclave communication buffer using a TLS connection, but it does not do the same for file I/O; Graphene-SGX ensures the integrity of file I/O by maintaining a Merkle tree of file chunk hashes inside the enclave. However, it does not protect the integrity of network I/O for applications without built-in TLS support.
To prevent buffer overflow attacks, the TEE must check buffer lengths. All three runtime systems do this.
(ii) Address ranges passed into the TEE are difficult to integrity check. For I/O operations, Panoply and Graphene-SGX pass 2 address ranges each into the TEE. They check that the ranges are entirely inside or outside of TEE memory, preventing an adversary from hijacking an enclave's control flow [12, 58] .
An adversary, however, may still manipulate addresses by reusing old ranges to roll back data, swapping ranges, or modifying ranges to corrupt data. All three runtime systems are vulnerable to such attacks, and the only effective mitigation is to avoid relying on untrusted address ranges. (iii) Pure/impure identifiers are commonly used as in parameters: Panoply passes 46, 2, and 4 identifiers into the TEE for I/O, events, and threading, respectively; Graphene-SGX passes 6 identifiers for I/O and 1 for threading; Haven passes 3, 1, and 1 identifiers for I/O, events and threading, respectively.
Adversaries may pass invalid or manipulated identifiers: if two file descriptors are swapped, the enclave may access incorrect files. Such malicious activity can be detected: Graphene-SGX maintains per-file HMACs, which reveal wrong file descriptors; incorrect network sockets can be detected by TLS. (iv) Semantic parameters must have their integrity verified on a case-by-case basis. All three systems use many semantic in parameters for I/O, events, time and threading operations.
For the semantic parameters with few valid values, such as errorcode and signum, the TEE can perform explicit checks; for ones with a larger domain, such as size, bounds checks are possible. None of these checks establish semantic correctness though. Since both Panoply and Graphene-SGX rely on the host file system, they can only check for the plausibility of returned file meta-data, such as st_size and st_blocks.
Designing a secure host interface
From the above discussion, we observe that it is non-trivial (and at worst impossible) to protect out parameters from leaking information and exposing access patterns and to verify the correctness of in parameters. Therefore, the first step in designing a secure host interface is to keep it narrow and minimise the number of parameters. Only functionality that cannot be provided within an enclave should be delegated to the host.
In addition, it is important to reduce the number and complexity of host call parameters. By building on low-level host calls instead of high-level POSIX abstractions the parameter types become simpler. For example, Graphene-SGX relies on
Read len bytes from disk image file at offset offset; returns bytes read disk_write(offset, buf, len) → int Write len bytes from buf to disk image file at offset offset; returns bytes written net_read(buf, len) → int Read at most len bytes from network device into buf; returns bytes read net_write(buf, len) → int Write len bytes from buf to network device; returns bytes written Events net_poll(eventmask) → reventmask Wait for eventmask events on network device; returns occurred events forward_signal(num, code, addr)
Forward signal num with description code occurred at addr to enclave Time time_read() → time Read time from untrusted vDSO memory region Table 2 : SGX-LKL host interface the host file system and thus must expose impure identifiers such as file names. A secure host interface should avoid delegating resource management to the host as much as possible. Based on these principles, Tab. 1 shows the host calls and parameter types of SGX-LKL, our TEE runtime system. It avoids address range and pure/impure identifiers and only requires simple semantic parameters.
Minimising the host interface
The SGX-LKL host interface is shown in Table 2 . SGX-LKL exposes only seven calls to the untrusted host, which relate to functionality that cannot be provided inside an SGX enclave: disk and network I/O operations, event handling, and time.
SGX-LKL host interface
I/O operations. SGX-LKL uses a low-level I/O interface. For disk I/O, disk_read() and disk_write() read from and write to a persistent block device, respectively. Each call takes an offset into the block device, a pointer buf to a buffer, and the length len of the data. For network I/O, net_read() and net_write() receive and send network packets. Both calls take a pointer buf to a buffer. For net_read, len contains the buffer size; for net_write, it is the number of bytes to be written. Events. A net_poll() call passes an eventmask to the host with the network events that SGX-LKL is waiting for. The call blocks until network packets are available to be read or outgoing packets can be sent. It returns which events have occurred.
SGX-LKL must handle hardware exceptions, such as page access violations or illegal instructions. An exception causes an enclave exit and transfers control to the host kernel. A forward_signal() call provides the signal description to the enclave: the signal number num, the cause code, and the associated memory address addr. The exception is then either processed by SGX-LKL directly or forwarded to the application if it has registered a corresponding signal handler. 
In-enclave OS functionality
The host interface described above allows SGX-LKL to access low-level host resources, but Linux applications require higher-level POSIX abstractions. To bridge this gap, SGX-LKL provides the following OS functions inside the enclave: (i) file system implementations; (ii) a TCP/IP network stack; (iii) threading and scheduling; (iv) memory management; (v) signal handling; and (vi) time. These OS functions are typically made accessible to userspace through system calls but, rather than invoking system calls directly, applications link against a C standard library (libc). Similar to other TEE runtime systems [8, 95] , SGX-LKL includes a libc implementation to support unmodified binaries that are dynamically linked against libc. Fig. 1 shows the SGX-LKL architecture. Next we describe the OS functionality provided inside the enclave in detail. The parts responsible for protecting the host interface (shown in green) and for making the interface oblivious (shown in orange) are described in §4 and §5, respectively.
An untrusted loader, sgx-lkl-run, creates the SGX enclave and loads the enclave library libsgxlkl.so, which runs alongside the application within the enclave. libsgxlkl.so includes a modified musl [70] C standard library that redirects system calls to an in-enclave library OS provided by the Linux Kernel Library (LKL) [80] . LKL is an architecture port of the Linux kernel to userspace. It enables SGX-LKL to make components such as the Linux kernel page cache, work queues, file system and network stack implementations, and crypto libraries available inside the enclave. As it is intended to run in userspace, LKL expects a set of LKL host operations, e.g. to create threads or allocate memory. Therefore, libsgxlkl.so includes further components for memory management, userlevel threading, signal handling and time. File system implementation. Existing TEE runtime systems [8, 87, 95] forward POSIX file operations to a host file system implementation. SGX-LKL cannot adopt this approach because it would expose security-sensitive metadata, such as file names, file sizes, file permissions, and directory structures. Instead, it provides complete in-enclave file system implementations via the Linux virtual file system (VFS) layer [14] . The VFS layer only requires two host operations for block-level disk I/O (disk_read() and disk_write(), see Table 2 ).
Applications operate on files through file descriptors as usual, which are handled by the ext4 file system implementation of LKL. LKL forwards block-level I/O requests to a virtio block device backend implemented by libsgxlkl.so, which issues disk_read() and disk_write() calls. On the host, the reads and writes are made to a single ext4 disk image file. The image is mapped into memory by sgx-lkl-run. Since the disk image file has a fixed size the read/write operations can be implemented efficiently by directly reading and writing to the mapped region from within the enclave.
This approach has three advantages: (i) it maintains a small host interface with only two disk I/O calls; (ii) it ensures that individual file accesses are not visible to the host, which can only observe reads/writes to disk block offsets; and (iii) the inenclave VFS implementation supports different file systems, such as the temporary in-memory file system /tmp, the /proc file system, and /dev for special device files. TCP/IP network stack. To provide a POSIX socket API, SGX-LKL uses LKL's TCP/IP stack to process packets within the enclave. This has three advantages: (i) it minimises the host interface because only access to a virtual network device to send/receive Ethernet frames is needed; (ii) it enables SGX-LKL to support any transport protocol, e.g. TCP or UDP, without extra host calls; and (iii) it exposes Linux networking features such as packet encryption (see §4.2).
To send/receive network traffic, sgx-lkl-run sets up a layer-2 TAP device. SGX-LKL implements a corresponding virtio network device backend inside the enclave. To be notified about incoming/outgoing packets, the backend issues a net_poll() request. The return value indicates if the device is ready for reading/writing packets using net_read() and net_write().
Memory management. SGX-LKL does not interact with the host for memory allocations/deallocations but a limitation of SGX version 1 is that the enclave size must be fixed at initialisation time. SGX-LKL therefore pre-allocates enclave memory and provides low-level memory management primitives inside the enclave. When an enclave is created, it initially contains libsgxlkl.so, SGX-specific memory pages such as the state save area (SSA) and thread control structure (TCS), and an uninitialised heap area. The heap area is exposed through both LKL and higher-level libc allocation functions, such as malloc() and free() as well as mmap(), mremap(), and munmap() directly implemented by SGX-LKL.
SGX-LKL supports both variable-and fixed-address anonymous mappings, and tracks free pages via a heap allocation bitmap. It implements mmap() by scanning the bitmap for consecutive free pages large enough for the requested allocation. To support private file mappings, files are loaded into enclave because SGX enclaves are bound to a linear address space.
SGX-LKL must support changing page permissions, e.g. when loading executables and libraries. In addition, applications may modify permissions directly: e.g. the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) requires executable pages for just-in-time compilation and changes of permissions for guard pages during garbage collection. While SGX pages have their own permissions, SGX version 1 requires these permissions to be set on enclave creation and does not permit subsequent changes.
As a workaround, SGX-LKL has an extra mem_protect() host call. All enclave pages are created with full SGX page permissions and the actual permissions are set via the hostcontrolled page table permissions. Since relying on the host to manage page permissions is a security risk, SGX version 2 adds the ability to control page permissions from within the enclave. Thread management. While SGX supports concurrency by allowing multiple host threads to enter an enclave, the maximum number of enclave threads must be specified at enclave creation time, which conflicts with dynamic thread creation. In addition, having a one-to-one relation between enclave and application threads means that the creation, joining, or exiting of threads as well as thread synchronisation requires host OS support, which poses a security threat [103] .
Therefore, SGX-LKL implements user-level threading based on the lthread library [62] and provides synchronisation primitives inside the enclave. A fixed number of host threads are assigned to enclave threads, which enter the enclave at startup and only leave when idle. Application threads and LKL kernel threads are lthreads, managed via the standard pthreads interface. SGX-LKL implements futex calls to provide other synchronisation primitives such as mutexes and semaphores. Signals. Applications can register custom signal handlers to handle exceptions, interrupts, or user-defined signals. Some signals, such as SIGALRM, can be handled entirely within the enclave; others such SIGSEGV or SIGILL are caused by hardware exceptions and result in an enclave exit and return control to the host OS. SGX-LKL must forward these signals from the untrusted host to custom signal handlers inside the enclave.
During initialisation, sgx-lkl-run registers signal handlers for all catchable signals with the host. All signals are forwarded via forward_signal(), which minimises the host interface because no separate calls for registering handlers are needed. It also hides application-specific handlers. SGX-LKL then checks for a corresponding application-registered signal handler and, if present, delivers the signal, or ignores it otherwise. Since application-registered signal handlers are managed within the enclave, calls such as sigaction() and sigprocmask() are supported without host interaction. Time. Applications, libraries and LKL frequently access time information, e.g. SGX-LKL reads the current time between context switches reschedule blocked threads and to trigger timer interrupts. Current SGX implementations, however, do not offer a high-performance in-enclave time source, and SGX-LKL relies on time provided by the host.
Instead of issuing expensive individual host calls, SGX-LKL uses the virtual dynamic shared object (vDSO) [100] mechanism of the Linux kernel. The kernel maps a small shared library to the address space outside of the enclave. On each clock tick, the host kernel updates a shared memory location with the current time for various clock sources, which are read from within the enclave when a time-related call is made.
For high precision, the vDSO mechanism requires the RDTSCP instruction to adjust for the time passed since the last vDSO update. In SGX version 1, the this instruction is not permitted inside enclaves. The accuracy of clock_gettime() in SGX-LKL thus depends on the frequency of vDSO updates; SGX version 2 does not have this limitation. Illegal instructions. Applications use the RDTSC instruction to read the timestamp counter or CPUID to discover CPU features. These instructions, however, are illegal inside SGX version 1 enclaves. As SGX-LKL must support unmodified binaries, illegal instructions cannot be replaced by corresponding host calls.
Instead, SGX-LKL catches the resulting SIGILL exception and emulates the instructions: RDTSC is executed outside the enclave, and the result is forwarded via the forward_signal() call; for CPUID, SGX-LKL caches all CPUID information during enclave set-up. This eliminates the need for an extra host call and also hides the CPUID information requested by an application.
Protecting the host interface
We now describe how SGX-LKL protects host calls from attacks.
Protecting disk I/O calls
Host disk blocks must have their confidentiality and integrity protected. For this, SGX-LKL uses the Linux device mapper subsystem [30] , which maps lower-level virtual block devices, such as SGX-LKL's virtio backend, to higher-level devices and allows for I/O data to be transformed along the way. VFS file systems such as ext4 use the virtual block device exposed by device mapper. Data can be encrypted and integrity protected transparently before it reaches the underlying device.
SGX-LKL uses different device mapper targets: (i) dmcrypt [32] provides full-disk encryption using AES in XTS mode with the sector number as an initialisation vector; (ii) dm-verity [34] offers volume-level read-only integrity protection through a Merkle tree of disk block hashes stored on the virtual disk; and (iii) dm-integrity [33] provides keybased block-level read/write integrity protection. For both AES-XTS and AES-GCM, SGX-LKL uses hardware acceleration through Intel's AES-NI instruction set extension. SGX-LKL combines the different targets to provide both confidentiality and integrity for block reads/writes, depending on the security requirements of the application. For example, for an in-memory caching application such as Memcached [64] , it is sufficient to protect the integrity of a readonly disk with dm-verity: the Memcached binary stored on disk must have its integrity protected, but no further sensitive data is stored on the disk. If the application itself is confidential or other application data is written to disk, dm-crypt can be used with either of the integrity protection targets. The use of different targets affects I/O performance, as we explore in §6.2.
Protecting network I/O calls
SGX-LKL must guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of all network data. Existing TEE runtime systems either require applications to have built-in support for network encryption [10, 95] or use TLS [8] . Not all application-level protocols, however, can use TLS transparently.
Instead, SGX-LKL exploits having a complete TCP/IP network stack inside the enclave, which enables it to provide transparent low-level network encryption. All data received and sent via the net_read() and net_write() host calls is automatically encrypted, authenticated and integrity-protected. To protect all network traffic, SGX-LKL uses Wireguard [105] , a layer 3 virtual private network (VPN) protocol, currently proposed for inclusion in the Linux kernel [60] .
SGX-LKL sets up Wireguard at initialisation time and exposes the VPN to the application through a network device with its own IP address. An application binding to this IP address is only reachable by trusted nodes in the VPN. Each Wireguard peer has a public/private key pair, which is bound to a VPN IP address and an endpoint, an (IP, port) pair through which the VPN is accessible. Wireguard uses the asymmetric key pairs to establish ephemeral symmetric session keys to protect messages using authenticated encryption, and nonces to prevent replay attacks. In contrast to TLS, which uses certificates, Wireguard identifies parties through public keys. It does not perform key distribution-SGX-LKL binds keys to enclave identities and supports provisioning of peers' keys (see §4.4).
Protecting event and time calls
For the remaining calls in Table 2 , SGX-LKL must ensure that an adversary cannot learn confidential data or compromise integrity by providing invalid data. net_poll(). While the eventmask reveals if the enclave wants to receive/send packets, this is already disclosed by the net_read and net_write calls. An adversary can return a wrong eventmask: as a result, either the net_read call fails, which can be handled transparently, or an invalid packet is read that fails Wireguard's integrity protection (see §4.2). forward_signal(). SGX-LKL must ensure that signals correspond to genuine events with valid signal descriptionsotherwise an adversary can cause an application signal handler to execute with invalid signal data. For signals triggered by hardware exceptions, SGX-LKL ensures that the passed address lies within the enclave range (e.g. SIGSEGV) or replaces the address with the current instruction pointer for signals that refer to a faulting instruction (e.g. SIGILL and SIGFPE). SGX-LKL can be configured to ignore user-controlled signals (e.g. SIGINT). time_read(). A challenge to integrity is that the returned time cannot be trusted. An adversary may return a timestamp that is not monotonically increasing and thus cause an underflow when an application calculates a timespan. SGX-LKL therefore checks for monotonicity for CLOCK_MONOTONIC_* clock sources.
Note that the official Intel SGX SDK provides trusted time for enclaves based on the Intel Management Engine (ME). Accesses, however, is slow and requests can be delayed by an adversary. Future TEE implementations may provide practical trustworthy time sources, which SGX-LKL could use.
Runtime attestation and secret provisioning
SGX-LKL must execute securely in an untrusted and potentially malicious environment. For this, it must allow (i) parties to remotely attest that they execute a trustworthy version of SGX-LKL in a genuine SGX enclave; (ii) applications to be deployed securely, i.e. guaranteeing both the confidentiality and integrity of application code; and (iii) applications to be provisioned securely with secrets such as cryptographic keys, configurations, and sensitive application data. The above requirements go beyond the attestation mechanisms of current SGX SDKs [50, 66] can attest a single enclave library, they assume that all application code is compiled into the library, and an enclave measurement therefore is sufficient to verify integrity. They also do not protect the confidentiality of the application code.
Applications typically must implement their own mechanism for secret provisioning, which is cumbersome. SGX-LKL addresses these issues as part of three phases: (i) application provisioning, (ii) remote attestation and (iii) secret provisioning. Fig. 2 shows the deployment workflow, involving three parties: (i) a service provider (SP) that wants to deploy an application and has a trusted client. For a distributed application, this may involve deploying multiple trusted peers; (ii) an untrusted host controlled by a cloud provider (CP) provodes enclaves; and (iii) the Intel Attestation Service (IAS), which allows the SP to verify an enclave measurement.
(1) Application provisioning. In step , the trusted client creates a disk image with the application binary and its dependencies. It can be created e.g. by exporting a Docker container image [35] -SGX-LKL provides a sgx-lkl-create tool to simplify the disk image creation process. The tool is based on cryptsetup [27], which configures dm-crypt for disk encryption and integrity protection. It outputs the disk encryption key and the root hash of the Merkle tree for dm-verity integrity protection. In step , the disk image file is sent to the CP. In preparation for attestation in step , the client generates a Wireguard asymmetric key pair. (2) Remote attestation. In step , the public key of the attestation key pair and the disk ID identifying the image is sent to the cloud host. The host then creates an enclave containing libsgxlkl.so (step ). libsgxlkl.so boots LKL, sets up the networking, and generates its Wireguard key pair. Now the enclave can be attested: libsgxlkl.so creates a report with a measurement of the enclave code. SGX allows custom data to be included with the report, which SGX-LKL uses to add the generated public key. The report is signed by an Intel-provided quoting enclave, and the resulting quote together with the enclave's public key is returned to the SP in step . In step , the SP sends the quote to the IAS, which returns a verification report, which is checked by the SP.
(3) Secret provisioning. After successful attestation, the SP establishes a secure communication channel with the enclave using the enclave public key. libsgxlkl.so takes a single Wireguard peer as an argument, which guarantees that no other party can communicate with the enclave.
In step , the SP sends the following information to the enclave: (i) the disk encryption key; (ii) the root hash; (iii) public keys of other trusted peers; and (iv) configuration data, including the path to the executable and its application arguments. In step , libsgxlkl.so mounts the disk and sets up the device mapper targets for decryption/integrity. It adds the new Wireguard peers, loads the application, and begins execution.
Making the host interface oblivious
As explained in §2.3, an adversary can compromise the confidentiality of an application by observing the execution of host calls. There are three characteristics of host calls that are side channels: (i) frequencies of calls, i.e. their number and time intervals. For example, there may be more host calls when an application processes data on disk, thus revealing information about its execution; (ii) sequences of calls, i.e. the order in which host calls are executed and the relationships between them. For example, an application may always execute reads before writes, allowing an adversary to make inferences about the execution; and (iii) parameters of calls. Although SGX-LKL encrypts data blocks written to the disk ( §4.1), the block offset reveals which file location is accessed. Observing the same offset repeatedly discloses the data layout on disk.
The main idea to mitigate against these side-channels is to make the host call interface oblivious [39] , i.e. ensuring that the sequence and frequency of calls as well as any observable parameters appear to be workload independent. We focus on the disk I/O host calls and discuss other calls in §5.4.
Disk I/O calls
SGX-LKL exposes two disk I/O calls to the host: disk_read() and disk_write(). These read and write fixed-size encrypted blocks at the specified offset (see §4.1). To prevent these calls from revealing information, SGX-LKL employs several techniques: (i) regarding frequencies, SGX-LKL discretises the execution of read/write calls into fixed time-interval rounds. In each round, it executes a fixed number of calls in a batch, potentially adding indistinguishable dummy calls; (ii) regarding sequences, SGX-LKL makes the order of read/write calls deterministic per batch by issuing them in a predefined order, e.g. always executing reads before writes; and (iii) regarding parameters, SGX-LKL ensures that all call parameters appear random, obscuring patterns. SGX-LKL makes accesses oblivious by using seemingly random offset parameters. Repeated accesses to the same disk block appear indistinguishable.
Hiding disk I/O accesses
SGX-LKL discretises the execution of all calls into fixed interval batches. Every t time units, SGX-LKL performs a single disk_read() followed by a disk_write(). When the LKL filesystem layer (see §3.2) issues a disk I/O call, instead of submitting it directly to the host, it is added to a host call queue. SGX-LKL's lthread scheduler checks if enough time has elapsed, and then issues the next call from the queue.
If there are too many read/write calls in the queue, the remaining calls are delayed until the next batch. Conversely, if there are not enough read/write calls from the application, SGX-LKL issues dummy calls to random blocks in order to pad that batch. This is done through dummy files in the file system and reading/writing blocks of those files.
The timing parameter t must be tuned for good performance because applications issue system calls at different rates: if t is lower than the application's call rate, SGX-LKL will issue more batches with dummy calls; if t is too high, the application will make slow progress. In our experiments, we use t = 0.1 ms, which works well across a range of applications workloads.
Hiding disk I/O parameters
Although SGX-LKL hides the number of calls, the call parameters (see Tab. 2) still leak information: (i) the data being read or written in buf; (ii) the disk offset; and (iii) the buffer length len. To hide the buf parameter, SGX-LKL uses probabilistic encryption [40] , which re-encrypts data before writing it (see §4.1). This prevents an adversary from discerning if written data is old or new, thus tracing data movement.
To hide the offset parameter, two traces of block access patterns must be indistinguishable from each other. File I/O calls made by the application pass through the file system layer, which can handle them from the LKL page cache, which is opaque to the host, or expose them to the host. The file system layer stores the mapping from logical to physical disk blocks. To hide repeated block accesses from the adversary, SGX-LKL must therefore shuffle blocks by changing this logical to physical block mapping in a manner opaque to the adversary.
Existing techniques from oblivious RAM (ORAM) [29, 39, 59, 89, 90, 102] can be used to provide oblivious access to blocks. LKL's page cache makes it well-suited to employ square root ORAM [39] -the page cache is analogous to a "shelter". As it is private to the enclave, it precludes, however, the need to scan it in its entirety for each access. and allows data to be accessed directly. Once a block has been added to the page cache, subsequent accesses to the same block are served from the page cache, until the page is removed, or flushed to disk. If such evicted blocks are requested again, the adversary could observe this. Therefore, SGX-LKL must obliviously reshuffle blocks before continuing with execu- tion [39] .
An oblivious shuffle moves blocks around so that an adversary cannot correlate the blocks before and after the shuffle. SGX-LKL uses a k-oblivious shuffle [77] . This assumes that k of the n source blocks are in the private cache. The algorithm then sequentially moves the n blocks from the source (either from the disk or from the cache) to the destination according to a randomly generated permutation of the blocks.
Alg. 1 describes the shuffle algorithm. Instead of shuffling the full disk, we assume a list of files that need to be shuffled, which can be obtained from a trace of files opened by the application. We divide the disk blocks into two parts: (i) blocks that belong to files that must be shuffled, i.e. the source array of size n; and (ii) a destination array of n unallocated blocks.
First, the algorithm determines the size max_blk of the largest file to be shuffled (lines 1-4), the number of free blocks (line 6). It uses this information to create a set of donor files (line 8), each of size max_blk, to fill up the free blocks. This set of donor files is used for swapping blocks with the source files. Next, the algorithm assigns an ordering to the blocks of the source files that need to be shuffled (line 10), mapping the set of source file blocks to natural numbers. It uses a Fisher-Yates shuffle [54] to produce a random permutation of the source file blocks (line 11). The algorithm then performs an iteration per source block to be shuffled (line 12). At each iteration, it determines the source file descriptor and file block number that maps to the current index according to the new permutation (lines [13] [14] . If the source block is already in the page cache, an unread source block, if any, is accessed and brought into the page cache (line 17).
Finally, a random donor file is selected, and the source block is swapped with the block from the donor file (line 18). The algorithm is implemented at the LKL ext4 layer because the shuffled blocks must be decrypted/encrypted by dm-crypt, as discussed in §4.1. The ext4 layer also stores the logical/-physical block mapping, which needs to be modified when blocks are swapped. SGX-LKL uses the EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT ioctl() call for this, which exchanges the blocks belonging to two different files, while also updating the underlying metadata. Once all the block have been swapped, the dummy files are unlinked, and the corresponding blocks become unallocated again.
Other host calls
Network I/O. To hide access patterns in network traffic, noise in the form of dummy network packets can be added to generate a constant stream of fixed size packets sent between participating trusted nodes [96, 99] . To an adversary, regular packets become indistinguishable from dummy packets, which are dropped by receivers. To scale to more clients, traffic could be routed through a trusted proxy, which establishes a single connection with each SGX-LKL enclave. Signals. Signals caused by the application disclose sensitive information. For example, if an application executes an illegal instruction, the resulting signal is observable. As described in §4.3, SGX-LKL hides what instruction caused the signal but cannot hide the exception itself. This is a limitation of Intel SGX-future TEE implementation may handle exceptions without host involvement. Time. The host kernel updates a vDSO memory region with the current time (see §3.2). It is read by the enclave, which is observable by an adversary. However, the SGX-LKL scheduler accesses time frequently on each context switch, and an adversary cannot distinguish between accesses from SGX-LKL and the application, hiding application-specific access patterns.
Evaluation
To understand the performance impact of SGX-LKL's design choices, we evaluate it with real application workloads and microbenchmarks. We conduct all the experiments on SGXenabled machines with Intel Xeon E3-1280 4-core CPUs with 8 MB LLC, 64 GB RAM, and a 10-Gbps network card. The machines run Ubuntu Linux 18.04, Linux Kernel 4.15.0-46, with the Intel SGX driver version 2.5. Our SGX version has an EPC size of 128 MB, and only around 90 MB are available to user applications. Since this limit is likely to increase in the future, we evaluate SGX-LKL in both simulation and hardware modes to ignore the overhead due to EPC paging. When using the oblivious host interface, we randomise the disk image and set the page cache size to be large enough for the input data. 
Application performance
We evaluate the performance of SGX-LKL with two dataintensive workloads, TensorFlow [1] and PARSEC [11] . In Fig. 3 , we report the training throughput with SGX-LKL in different modes compared to native execution. SGX-LKL outperforms native in simulation mode: the training throughput of ResNet-34, ResNet-50 and ResNet-101 is higher than native by 28%, 33% and 32%, respectively. SGX-LKL achieves better performance due to LKL's implementation of system calls as standard function calls. The results also show that the overhead of disk encryption and integrity checking is negligible.
With oblivious host calls with disk encryption, SGX-LKL experiences a slow-down: the training throughput for AlexNet decreases by 24% (ImageNet) and 37% (CIFAR10) compared to simulation mode, or 14% and 21% compared to native execution. The impact of oblivious host calls on the ResNet models is less significant: the training performance of SGX-LKL is almost equal to native. This is due to the different I/O characteristics of the networks: AlexNet processes more images than ResNet per second, thus stressing the oblivious host calls and requiring more shuffle operations. In Fig. 4 , we also explore inference throughput with SGX-LKL in different modes compared to native. The results show the same trend as training: the inference throughput is higher than the native system by 22% for AlexNet with ImageNet, 42% for AlexNet with CIFAR10, 29% for ResNet-34, 26% for ResNet 50, and 20% for ResNet 101. The throughput is lower than native with oblivious host calls by 79% (AlexNet with ImageNet), 15% (AlexNet with CIFAR-10), 53% (ResNet-101), 50% (ResNet-50), and 43% (ResNet-34). We conclude that CPU-intensive networks are less affected by the oblivious call interface, while I/O-intensive networks are more affected. PARSEC. We use five PARSEC benchmarks [97] with different working set sizes to explore the performance of SGX-LKL in SGX hardware mode. All workloads execute with four threads, and the input size is "simlarge".
Fig . 5 shows the execution with SGX-LKL with different security guarantees. Without oblivious host calls, SGX-LKL in simulation mode is 1.05× slower than native. The overhead for streamcluster is 1.07×; fluidanimate has the same performance as native; for canneal and blackscholes, the slowdown is 1.12× and 1.13×, respectively. We conclude that, without EPC size limitations, the performance of SGX-LKL without oblivious host calls is comparable to native execution.
In hardware mode, the overhead of workloads with the small to medium working set sizes is 1.3× (streamcluster), 1.4× (blackscholes) and 1.7× (bodytrack). With large working sets, fluidanimate and canneal are slower by 4× and 15×, respectively, which is due to the limited EPC size.
With oblivious host calls, streamcluster shows similar overheads in simulation (2.4×) and hardware modes (2.8×). Since streamcluster does not have input files, no shuffling is required, and the overhead solely comes from the dummy calls; for benchmarks with input files, e.g. blackscholes, the overhead in hardware mode is higher (3.6×) due to the shuffling. For fluidanimate and canneal, which have large memory footprints, we observe an overhead of up to 2× in simulation; in hardware mode, the overhead rises to 10× and 21×, respectively, due to SGX paging.
Disk I/O performance
We evaluate disk I/O performance by measuring the sequential read throughput when reading an uncached 1 GB file from an SSD. We consider different configurations: (i) unencrypted; (ii) with full disk encryption (FDE) via dm-crypt using AES-XTS; and (iii) with FDE and integrity protection via dm-crypt and dm-integrity using AES-GCM. Fig. 6 shows that SGX-LKL achieves near native performance without encryption or integrity protection, fully saturating the SSD bandwidth of approx. 510 MB/sec. With FDE, the throughput decreases to 320 MB/sec (62%) of native throughput in hardware mode. Enabling integrity protection further reduces throughput to around 230 MB/sec (45%). This shows the benefit of using x86-specific cryptographic instructions.
Network I/O performance
We evaluate network performance by measuring throughput for different buffer sizes with iperf version 3.1.3 [52] .
As Fig. 7 shows, for both native and SGX-LKL, throughput increases with larger buffer sizes. For 256 byte packets, SGX-LKL reaches about 0.7× and 0.9× of native throughput in hardware and simulation modes, respectively. For small buffers, the throughput is client-bound. Native execution saturates the network bandwidth of about 9.4 Gbps with 4 KB buffers. Here SGX-LKL reaches a throughput of 5.1 Gbps (0.5×) in hardware mode, and 5.7 Gbps (0.6×) in simulation mode. Due to its support for TCP segmentation offloading, SGX-LKL performs better for larger buffer sizes: with 64 KB buffers, SGX-LKL reaches a maximum throughput of 8.4 Gbps (0.9×) and 8.8 Gbps (0.9×) for hardware and simulation modes, respectively.
With Wireguard and 256 byte buffers, throughput for hardware and simulation mode is 0.44 Gbps and 0.54 Gbps, respectively; with buffers larger than 4 KB, the throughput increases to 2.0 Gbps and 2.2 Gbps, respectively. Here Wireguard decryption becomes the bottleneck.
7 Related Work TEE runtime systems. As mentioned in §2.3, Haven [10] , Graphene-SGX [95] , and Panoply [87] are existing TEE runtime systems, but they have wider host interfaces than SGX-LKL and do not support an oblivious host interface. Similar to SGX-LKL, SCONE [8] also implements user-level threading inside the enclave to reduce costly enclave transitions of threads. Ryoan [46] uses SGX enclaves to sandbox data processing. It makes the data flow independent from the content of the input data but does bot make the host interface oblivious. ORAM with TEEs can conceal access patterns. ZeroTrace [84] combines SGX with ORAM to create oblivious memory primitives. ObliDB [38] and Oblix [67] use Path ORAM [89] with SGX to hide the access patterns of SQL queries. In Raccoon [81] , Path ORAM hides array accesses that depend on secrets. By using ORAM, these approaches can hide access pattern but hosts can still mount Iago attacks when returning data blocks to the enclave. Oblivious file systems. Obliviate [2] is an oblivious file system for SGX enclaves. It adapts an ORAM protocol to read-/write a data file. Privatefs [104] is an ORAM-based parallel oblivious file system, which suports concurrent accesses. Oladi [26] is a cloud-based key/value store that supports oblivious transactions while protecting access patterns from cloud providers. Bittau et al. [13] introduce an oblivious architecture for monitoring client software behaviour while protecting user privacy. In constrast to SGX-LKL, these approaches do not offer a file system abstraction with POSIX semantics. Unobservable communication. For message systems, hiding which users communicate is challenging. Anonymous networks such as Tor [31] are susceptible to traffic analysis attacks [45, 69] . Dining Cryptographers (DC) networks [18, 88, 106] provide stronger guarantees by broadcasting messages to all users, but incur a high overhead. More recently, Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [5, 22, 25] and differential privacy techniques [9, 96, 99] add noise to hide the metadata. These approaches can be leveraged by SGX-LKL to blind communications.
Conclusion
We described SGX-LKL, a TEE runtime system that is designed around a minimal and oblivious host interface. SGX-LKL executes Linux binaries by using the Linux kernel to provide POSIX abstractions inside of SGX enclaves, and it shuffles disk blocks to hide access patterns from the host. Ignoring SGX paging effects, SGX-LKL's performance overhead is low, even for complex applications such as TensorFlow.
